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I.

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (Korematsu

Center) is a non-profit organization based at the Seattle University School
of Law. The Korematsu Center works to advance justice through
research, advocacy, and education. Inspired by the legacy of Fred
Korematsu, who defied military orders during World War II that
ultimately led to the unlawful incarceration of 110,000 Japanese
Americans, the Korematsu Center works to advance social justice for all.
It has a special interest in ensuring that juvenile sentencing reflects the
widely accepted body of scientific literature demonstrating that youth are
less culpable and have a greater capacity for reformation. The Korematsu
Center also works to understand and remedy the racial disproportionality
that plagues our criminal justice system, including how the auto-decline
statute disproportionately subjects youth of color to adult punishment.
The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or otherwise, represent the
official views of Seattle University.
II.

ISSUE ADDRESSED BY AMICUS

Whether Washington’s “auto-decline” statute,
RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v), which requires that certain juvenile offenders be
tried as adults without regard for their individual characteristics or
circumstances, violates the prohibition against cruel punishment in
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article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution, and the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Zyion Houston-Sconiers and Treson Roberts were convicted for
their participation in a group of youth that robbed trick-or-treaters at
gunpoint on Halloween night, 2012. The group stole candy and a phone
but inflicted no bodily harm. Zyion was 17 at the time of the offense, and
Treson was 16.
Normally, defendants under the age of 18 are subject to the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. But because of their
ages and the crimes with which they were charged, Zyion and Treson were
subject to Washington’s “auto-decline” statute, under which adult courts
have automatic, exclusive jurisdiction over 16- and 17-year-old offenders
charged with certain offenses. The purpose of the auto-decline statute is
to expose juveniles to adult sentencing schemes, including mandatory
enhancements. As a result of mandatory firearm enhancements, Zyion
was sentenced to 31 years in prison, and Treson was sentenced to 26
years. The trial court had no discretion to impose shorter sentences, and it
had no discretion to evaluate whether treatment of these teenage
defendants as adults was appropriate in the first place.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Judge Bjorgen
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dissented, arguing that imposing these sentences mechanically, “as though
by the touch of gear on gear,” violated the Eighth Amendment. State v.
Houston-Sconiers, 191 Wn. App. 436, ¶ 35 (2015) (Bjorgen, J.,
dissenting). He argued that the sentences could not be imposed without
the “exercise of human discretion, taking into account all that law and
science tells us about the nature of juveniles and the possibility of
amendment of life.” Id.
IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Children are different from adults, and two children of the same
age can be very different from one another. Over the last decade, both this
Court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized that these
differences are of constitutional significance, and have thus repeatedly
struck down sentencing schemes that do not allow consideration of a
defendant’s youthfulness.
Washington’s “auto-decline” statute, in concert with the state’s
adult sentencing laws, creates precisely the kind of impermissible scheme
that recent case law has rejected. Under the auto-decline statute, a 16- or
17-year-old defendant charged with certain crimes is automatically tried in
adult court, with no opportunity to demonstrate that his or her
youthfulness and related characteristics make trial as an adult
inappropriate. If the teenage defendant is convicted, he or she is
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automatically sentenced as an adult. In some cases—including this one—
the defendant is subject to mandatory enhancements that result in decadeslong sentences plainly inappropriate for the vast majority of juveniles.
Even where mandatory enhancements do not apply, a teenage
defendant bears the burden to prove that his or her characteristics warrant
an exceptional downward sentence, creating a perverse presumption that
children are adults until proven otherwise. In either case, juvenile
defendants subject to auto-decline face a significant probability of
receiving sentences that are disproportionate in light of their youthfulness.
At least until substantial new safeguards are enacted for youth defendants
sentenced in adult courts, 1 that probability renders the auto-decline statute
unconstitutional under both article I, section 14 and the Eighth
Amendment.

1

The so-called legislative Miller fix provides procedural safeguards to youth offenders
convicted of aggravated murder, allowing those offenders to petition the indeterminate
sentence review board for early release at 5 years prior to the expiration of their
minimum term. RCW 10.95.030(3). And RCW 9.94A.730 provides a similar procedural
safeguard to youth offenders convicted of crimes committed before their eighteenth
birthdays who are serving sentences longer than 20 years, by allowing those offenders to
petition for early release after serving 20 years. However, these two statutes do not reach
all juveniles sentenced as adults by operation of the auto-decline statute. Further, these
statutes do nothing to prevent the initial imposition of unconstitutional sentences—i.e.,
sentences imposed without consideration of the offender’s youth and individual
circumstances. A disproportionate sentence is disproportionate on the day it is imposed,
even if there is some possibility of serving less than the entire term.
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V.
A.

ARGUMENT

Article I, section 14 of the Washington constitution prohibits
disproportionate sentences and therefore requires sentencing
courts to consider an offender’s youthfulness.
The Washington constitution prohibits “cruel punishment,” Const.

art. I, § 14, and it “is more protective than the Eighth Amendment”
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment.” State v. Witherspoon, 180
Wn.2d 875, 887 (2014). In addition to proscribing “certain modes of
punishment,” this provision requires that “sentences of ordinary
imprisonment” be “proportional[]”—that is, “commensurate with the
crimes for which such sentences are imposed.” State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d
387, 395-96 (1980).
Recent developments in the jurisprudence of this Court and the
U.S. Supreme Court have established that the youthfulness of a juvenile
defendant is central to the proportionality inquiry. This jurisprudential
shift also recognizes that sentencing schemes that do not allow adequate
consideration of the youthfulness of juvenile offenders create a substantial
risk that disproportionate sentences will be imposed, rendering the
schemes themselves incompatible with the constitutional proportionality
requirement. In this case, the Court should recognize that the auto
decline-statute is similarly unconstitutional under both article I,
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section 14 2 and the Eighth Amendment, as it subjects youth to sentencing
schemes that do not permit adequate consideration of youthfulness.
1.

The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
youthfulness must be considered when sentencing
juvenile offenders.

The U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the
substantive standards imposed by the Eighth Amendment progress over
time, keeping pace with the “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society” and incorporating new insights and
knowledge that bear on the legitimacy of certain criminal punishments.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1
(2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L.
Ed. 2d 630 (1958) (plurality op.)). Thus, while in 1878 it was “safe to
2

Petitioners argue in their supplemental briefs that the auto-decline statute violates
article I, section 14. Br. of Pet. Houston-Sconiers at 16; Br. of Pet. Roberts. In the event
this Court concludes that this state constitutional argument was not adequately raised
below by the parties, but see Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.
Ed. 2d 438 (1971) (party need not “cit[e] ‘book and verse’” to preserve constitutional
argument); RAP 2.5(a)(3), the Court should nonetheless exercise its discretion to
consider it here. See Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 46 v. City of Everett, 146 Wn.2d
29, 36-37 (2002) (Supreme Court may consider argument not raised below where issue is
of public importance and addressing it would serve judicial economy). Ensuring fair and
humane treatment of children in the criminal justice system is a matter of paramount
public importance. And the volume of litigation in this Court and the Courts of Appeals
involving the auto-decline statute demonstrates that resolving questions regarding the
validity of that statute here will serve judicial economy significantly. See, e.g., State v.
Posey, 161 Wn.2d 638 (2012) (addressing effect of acquittal on count that qualified youth
defendant for auto-decline); State v. Salavea, 151 Wn.2d 133 (2004) (addressing time at
which age criterion must be satisfied); In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Dalluge, 152
Wn.2d 772 (2004) (effect of dismissal of qualifying count); State v. Mora, 138 Wn.2d 43
(1999) (same); State v. Solis-Diaz, 194 Wn. App.129 (2016) (vacating second adult
sentence of youth defendant subject to auto-decline after successful petition for postconviction relief).
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affirm” that drawing and quartering, public dissection, and burning at the
stake would violate the Constitution, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 13536, 25 L. Ed. 345 (1878), over the course of the twentieth century the
Court extended the reach of the Eighth Amendment to prohibit more than
patently barbaric modes of execution. It applied the provision to
invalidate a severe prison sentence for falsifying public records, Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed. 793 (1910), to
prohibit any custodial punishment at all under a statute that criminalized
addiction to narcotics, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, 82 S.
Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962), and to hold generally that a “criminal
sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant was
convicted,” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed.
2d 637 (1983). 3
The Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in this century has
centered on its evolving understanding of the characteristics of children
and how these characteristics in youth offenders bear upon the traditional
retributive goals of the criminal justice system. In Roper, the Court
invalidated the death sentence of a defendant who was 17 when he

3

The Court addressed the proportionality standard again in a fractured series of opinions
in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991).
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in that case adopted a “grossly disproportionate”
standard for constitutional review of the length of prison sentences. Id. at 1001
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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committed the crime of which he was convicted. 543 U.S. at 556. It
explained that three “general differences between juveniles under 18 and
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be
classified among the worst offenders.” Id. at 569. First, “as any parent
knows and as … scientific and sociological studies … tend to confirm,”
the “lack of maturity and … underdeveloped sense of responsibility” that
are understandably found in children “often result in impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions.” Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” Id.
Finally, the “character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
adult,” meaning that juvenile defendants, in general, are more likely to be
successfully reformed. Id. at 570. The upshot was that a death sentence
that may be permissible for an adult offender could not be imposed on
juvenile offenders “whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished,
to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.” Id. at 571.
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), the Court followed the reasoning in
Roper to hold that a sentence of life in prison without parole for a juvenile
convicted of a non-homicide crime violated the Eighth Amendment. It
explained that “[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment,
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and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into
account at all would be flawed.” Id. at 76.
In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012),
the Court extended its holdings in Roper and Graham to hold that “penalty
schemes” that include mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment because they impose harsh
sentences without appropriate consideration of the youthfulness of the
defendant. Id. at 2466. “By removing youth from the balance,” the
mandatory schemes the Court invalidated “prevent[ed] the sentencer from
taking into account [the] central considerations” identified in Graham.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466.
Most recently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L.
Ed. 2d 599 (2016), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition
on mandatory life without parole for juveniles that was recognized in
Miller was a “substantive right” (and therefore retroactive), and explicitly
stated that “[a] hearing where ‘youth and its attendant characteristics’ are
considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those juveniles
who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not.”
Id. at 736 (citation omitted).
The quartet of cases beginning with Roper establish that children
are different from adults for Eighth Amendment purposes and that some
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sentences that may be appropriate for adult defendants are nonetheless
unconstitutional when imposed on juveniles.
2.

In State v. O’Dell, this Court recognized that
youthfulness must be considered whenever young
offenders are sentenced.

This Court followed the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions described above in State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 (2015). 4
There, this Court reversed the 95-month sentence of a defendant who had
committed statutory rape 10 days after his 18th birthday. The trial court
imposed the sentence after concluding that it was barred from
“consider[ing] age as a mitigating circumstance” under adult sentencing
scheme. Id. at 685. Relying extensively on Eighth Amendment
precedents and “advances in the scientific literature,” this Court held that a
trial court “must be allowed to consider youth as a mitigating factor when
imposing a sentence” on young-adult defendants who were just over 18
when they committed their crimes. Id. at 695-96 (emphasis added).
Even though the defendant in O’Dell was, in fact, a young adult at
the time the offense was committed, this Court’s decision relied upon the
recent developments in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and recognized
more broadly that there must be a meaningful opportunity to consider the

4

The State’s attempt to limit Miller’s application in Washington, Resp’t Br. at 13-14,
simply ignores O’Dell.
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youthfulness and maturity of a young defendant before a sentence can be
imposed. And, like the Court in Miller, this Court reversed the sentence of
the defendant in O’Dell without finding that that sentence was, in fact,
disproportionate to the defendant’s offense. Rather, the sentence was
invalid because, as a procedural matter, the trial court failed to consider the
defendant’s youthfulness as a potential mitigating factor. Id. at 698-99.
3.

Criminal procedures that prevent adequate
consideration of the youthfulness of juvenile defendants
at sentencing violate the Eighth Amendment and
article I, section 14.

Roper, Graham, and Miller also demonstrate that sentencing
regimes that fail to provide an adequate opportunity for consideration of
the youthfulness of juvenile defendants are themselves unconstitutional.
Critically, the Court in Miller did not hold merely that disproportionate
sentences that resulted from a flawed scheme violated the Eighth
Amendment. Instead, it held that the scheme itself was unconstitutional—
recognizing a procedural corollary to the right against cruel and unusual
punishment that “require[s]” the state to “take into account how children
are different, and how those differences counsel against” extraordinarily
severe sentences. 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Graham, 560 U.S. at 76; see also
Houston-Sconiers, 191 Wn. App. ¶ 35 (Bjorgen, J., dissenting) (“The
lesson of Miller … is that the Eighth Amendment does not allow the
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possibility of forfeitures of such magnitude to be raised automatically for
crimes committed by children.”) (emphasis added). 5 Because article I,
section 14 is more protective than the Eighth Amendment, it follows that
our state constitution must also prohibit procedures that prevent courts
from considering the youthfulness of juvenile offenders.
B.

The auto-decline statute prevents adequate consideration of
the youthfulness of juvenile offenders and creates a
constitutionally significant risk of disproportionate
punishment, in violation of article I, section 14.
Just as the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that criminal

procedures that create a significant risk of disproportionate sentences by
preventing adequate consideration of a juvenile defendant’s youthfulness
violate the Eighth Amendment, this Court should hold that the autodecline statute violates article I, section 14. As set forth in more detail
below, the auto-decline statute both deprives the juvenile offender of the
opportunity to establish lessened culpability at a declination hearing and

5

These cases also call into question the narrow view articulated by this Court in In re
Boot that Eighth Amendment issues are “not ordinarily . . . ripe for adjudication until . . .
[a defendant is] actually sentenced.” 130 Wn.2d 553, 569 (1996). Graham and Miller
invalidated the entire sentencing schemes under which the individual sentences at issue
were imposed, teaching that for Eighth Amendment purposes (and therefore for article I,
section 14 purposes as well), the constitutional analysis of punishment focuses on
statutory schemes as a whole, and not simply at the sentences received. Graham, 560
U.S. at 76 (“criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into
account at all would be flawed.”); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. In any event, the petitioners
here have been sentenced, unlike the petitioners in Boot.
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subjects that juvenile offender to adult sentencing schemes. 6 Sentencing a
juvenile under an adult sentencing scheme carries with it a constitutionally
cognizable risk that juvenile defendants will be sentenced without
adequate consideration of their particular maturity and other age-related
characteristics. 7
1.

The auto-decline statute prevents consideration of
youthfulness at two distinct points.

The auto-decline statute was enacted with the intention to “address
the problem of youth violence by increasing the severity and certainty of
punishment for youth who commit violent acts.” State v. Mora, 138
Wn.2d 43, 50 (1999). It operates by preventing the consideration of the
youthfulness of defendants at two distinct points in the life of the case.
First, auto-decline deprives the juvenile court of the opportunity to
conduct a decline hearing at the outset of the case. 8 A decline hearing
6

The State’s acknowledgement of the purpose of the auto-decline statute—“to increase
potential punishment for certain [juvenile] offenders,” Resp’t Br. at 15 —contradicts its
own assertion later in its brief that “[a]ssignment of certain older juveniles who are
charged with violent or other serious crimes to adult court is not punitive in nature,”
Resp’t Br. at 18, and belies its characterization of the issue in this case as one merely of
jurisdiction. Both petitioners and amicus ask this Court to determine whether the risks
and consequences that flow from the auto-decline statute pass constitutional muster.
7
In Boot, 130 Wn.2d 553, this Court rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to the
auto-decline statute on ripeness grounds, as the defendants had not yet been sentenced.
The Court did not hold that sentencing children as adults without consideration of their
youth and related individual factors was permissible. And even if it had, that conclusion
is flatly contradicted by Miller. Importantly, moreover, the Court in Boot explicitly
acknowledged that it considered “only federal constitutional law”—it did not consider
article I, section 14. Id. at 569.
8
When a juvenile is charged with a crime that is not subject to the auto-decline statute,
the court may hold a hearing and transfer the defendant for prosecution as an adult “upon
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requires the juvenile court to “consider the relevant reports, facts,
opinions, and arguments presented by the parties and their counsel,” which
may include evidence regarding the youthfulness and maturity of the
defendant. RCW 13.40.110(3). Thus, the auto-decline statute precludes
any judicial consideration of the particular characteristics of the juvenile
before it automatically subjects the juvenile to adjudication in adult court.
Even if adult court is plainly an inappropriate forum for a particular
juvenile offender, or if adult penalties are plainly disproportionate for a
teenager, the adult court has no authority to remand a case governed by
auto-decline to juvenile court without the consent of the prosecutor.
RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(E)(III). This is precisely the sort of law
“prevent[ing]” consideration of the particular characteristics of a juvenile
offender that the Federal and Washington constitutions prohibit. Miller,
132 S. Ct. at 2458; O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 696-99.
Second, auto-decline subjects juvenile defendants to adult
sentencing, which never provides an adequate opportunity for
consideration of a juvenile defendant’s youthfulness, and can result in
long mandatory sentence enhancements—as Zyion’s and Treson’s

a finding that the declination would be in the best interest of the juvenile or the public.”
RCW 13.40.110(3). While decline hearings are discretionary in many cases, they are
mandatory for certain offenses—if a 16- or 17-year-old defendant is charged with a Class
A felony, for example, the court is required to hold a decline hearing.
RCW 13.40.110(2)(a).

14

sentences so powerfully reflect. Zyion was sentenced to “the mandatory
372 months’ confinement”—31 years—for the seven firearms
enhancements with which he was charged. Treson was sentenced to 312
months—26 years—for six firearms enhancements. The trial court had no
discretion to reduce or decline to impose those sentences—even in the
face of the State’s recommendation that both defendants receive
exceptional sentences of zero months for the underlying crimes, which the
trial court followed. Houston-Sconiers, 191 Wn. App. ¶ 7. That Zyion
and Treson would enter prison as teenagers and not be released until they
were middle-aged adults could not affect this mandatory sentence.
Thus, in this situation, the law “fail[s] to take defendants’
youthfulness into account at all”—exactly the kind of procedure the Court
in Graham described as “flawed.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 76. The autodecline statute first prevented Zyion and Treson from advocating that their
cases be tried in juvenile court, and then subjected them to the adult
sentencing scheme, which imposed mandatory decades-long sentences and
precluded the sentencing court from adequately “consider[ing] youth as a
mitigating factor when imposing a sentence.” O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at
696. 9

9

Zyion Houston-Sconiers and Treson Roberts were sentenced before this Court decided
O’Dell, so neither they nor the trial court had the benefit of that decision.
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2.

The auto-decline statute creates a constitutionally
significant risk that juvenile offenders will receive
disproportionate sentences under adult sentencing
schemes.

Even if the operation of auto-decline does not result in
disproportionate sentences in every case, it is unconstitutional simply
because it “poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Miller,
132 S. Ct. at 2469. Even where a juvenile defendant subject to autodecline does not face a mandatory sentencing enhancement, he or she still
faces treatment as an adult under the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”).
See RCW 9.94A.030(35) (defining “offender” to include “a person who …
is less than eighteen years of age but whose case is under superior court
jurisdiction under RCW 13.04.030”). When the Legislature enacted the
SRA in 1981, it designed the statute for fully culpable adult offenders,
without “the benefit of … advances in the scientific literature” described
in Roper and its progeny that show that “age may well mitigate a
defendant’s culpability.” O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 695.
It is true that under O’Dell, a young defendant may argue that his
or her youthfulness is a “mitigating circumstance[]” that warrants an
“exceptional sentence below the standard range.” RCW 9.94A.535(1).
Crucially, however, it is still the defendant’s burden to “establish[]” the
mitigating circumstance “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. That
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is likely sufficient for young-adult defendants like the one in O’Dell—a
defendant who, although he was only a few days over 18 when he
committed the crime at issue, was nonetheless old enough to vote, to serve
on a jury, to purchase tobacco, and to be conscripted into the armed forces.
A presumption that a legal adult has the characteristics of an adult makes
sense.
On the other hand, a presumption that a legal child has the
characteristics of an adult does not make sense. A juvenile defendant may
struggle to establish youth as a mitigating circumstance for any of a
number of reasons—ineffective or overextended counsel, inadequate
resources to muster compelling expert and lay testimony, or simply a trial
court’s reflexive but scientifically inaccurate belief that juveniles who
commit “adult” crimes are somehow more mature than their peers. None
of those is a good reason to punish a child as an adult. Absent an
antecedent judicial finding (as in a declination hearing) that a juvenile
defendant ought to be treated as an adult, assigning juvenile defendants the
burden to prove youth as a mitigating factor prevents courts from
appropriately considering the youthfulness of juvenile defendants. If the
State believes that a particular child charged with a crime is markedly
unlike other children—i.e., that the defendant lacks the characteristics of
youth that require differential treatment at sentencing—the State should
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bear the burden of establishing the juvenile acted with adult culpability.
The legislature might be able to remedy this constitutional defect
by amending adult sentencing laws to (1) eliminate mandatory sentence
enhancements for juveniles tried as adults and (2) establish a rebuttable
presumption that juvenile defendants tried in adult courts should receive
exceptional sentences below the standard range. 10 But it has not done so.
In the meantime, the auto-decline statute denies juvenile defendants any
opportunity to argue that treatment as adults is inappropriate and continues
to send them to be tried and sentenced under unconstitutional procedures
that do not adequately take their youthfulness into consideration. Unless
and until the Legislature significantly revises sentencing laws as they
apply to juvenile defendants in adult courts, Washington’s auto-decline
statute violates article I, section 14.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Court should agree with Petitioners that the auto-decline
statute, RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v), violates the Eighth Amendment and
article I, section 14 because it exposes juvenile defendants to adult
sentencing laws without providing an opportunity for their youthfulness to
be adequately considered.
10

However, legislative changes to the adult sentencing scheme would not be sufficient to
address other potential constitutional problems with auto-decline, including due process
concerns inherent in mandatory trial of juvenile defendants in adult courts. See Br. of
Pet. Roberts.
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